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All the ideas for 'Summa totius logicae', 'Ideas' and 'Travels in Four Dimensions'

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60 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Because of Darwin, wisdom as a definite attainable state has faded [Watson]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The three key ideas are the soul, Europe, and the experiment [Watson]
The big idea: imitation, the soul, experiments, God, heliocentric universe, evolution? [Watson]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
From an impossibility anything follows [William of Ockham]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
Babylonian thinking used analogy, rather than deduction or induction [Watson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A proposition is true if its subject and predicate stand for the same thing [William of Ockham]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
Ockham had an early axiomatic account of truth [William of Ockham, by Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The word 'every' only signifies when added to a term such as 'man', referring to all men [William of Ockham]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Mesopotamian numbers applied to specific things, and then became abstract [Watson]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Just as unity is not a property of a single thing, so numbers are not properties of many things [William of Ockham]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The words 'thing' and 'to be' assert the same idea, as a noun and as a verb [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
If essence and existence were two things, one could exist without the other, which is impossible [William of Ockham]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Some concepts for propositions exist only in the mind, and in no language [William of Ockham]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
Modern democracy is actually elective oligarchy [Watson]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Greek philosophers invented the concept of 'nature' as their special subject [Watson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
DNA mutation suggests humans and chimpanzees diverged 6.6 million years ago [Watson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
During the rise of civilizations, the main gods changed from female to male [Watson]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Hinduism has no founder, or prophet, or creed, or ecclesiastical structure [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Monotheism was a uniquely Israelite creation within the Middle East [Watson]
Modern Judaism became stabilised in 200 CE [Watson]
The Israelites may have asserted the uniqueness of Yahweh to justify land claims [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 3. Zoroastrianism
The Gathas (hymns) of Zoroastrianism date from about 1000 BCE [Watson]
Zoroaster conceived the afterlife, judgement, heaven and hell, and the devil [Watson]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Paul's early writings mention few striking episodes from Jesus' life [Watson]
Jesus never intended to start a new religion [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 1. Confucianism
Confucius revered the spiritual world, but not the supernatural, or a personal god, or the afterlife [Watson]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
Taoism aims at freedom from the world, the body, the mind, and nature [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The three basic ingredients of religion are: the soul, seers or priests, and ritual [Watson]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
In ancient Athens the souls of the dead are received by the 'upper air' [Watson]